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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL M. HABBESHAW, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
~ETA CAHOL HABBESHAW, ) 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
10356 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Respondent, Russell M. Habbeshaw, filed a 
Complaint for diYorce in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, on the 18th day of September, 
1963. SerYice of Summons and Complaint was obtained 
on the Appellant and the Return of Service filed with 
the Court on the 19th day of September, 1963. No 
answer nor appearance whatsoever was filed by the 
1 
Appellant, and a default divorce was granted th Re 
spondent on January 3, 1964. e · 
A Motion to Vacate the Judgment was filed hr th 
Appellant and by Stipulation of parties tlie De · e cree 11: 
Divorce was set aside. The Appellant was allowed 
1
; 
file an Answer and Counter-Claim. The matter wa~ 
heard without jury before the Honorable Stewart )I. 
Hanson, Judge, on the 12th day of May, 1964, anda 
Decree of Divorce was granted. The Appellant filed 
a Motion For a New Trial on the 27th day of July. 
1964 and an amended J\Iotion For New Trial on the 
26th day of February, 1965, and both Motions were 
denied, from which Order the Appellant appeals. 
The appeal of the Appellant is taken from !hf 
property settlement and alimony provisions of the De-
cree of Divorce, on the theory that the Appellant dia 
not know the true value nor the extent of the proper!)' 
acquired by the parties during their marriage whicn 
constituted newly discovered evidence which could not 
with reasonable diligence have been discovered ana 
produced at the time of the trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
. . ht (281 The parties were married for twenty-eig . 1 
years ( R-63) . Four children were born, three of ~tn 
are married, the fourth is 21 years old but .res1 :: 
with Appellant (R. 64). During the m~rri~ge 5 It . t I properties ID 3 parties acqmred numerous ren a 
2 
• 
Lake City (See Exhibit P-1) and Respondent operated 
the business known as Auerbach's Tearoom. (R-70). 
The properties were given a value of approxi-
mately $:308,000.00 with equity interests of approxi-
mately $17:3,000.00. See Exhibit P and Respondent's 
testimony ( R 64-69, 77, 78, 86, 88, 110-112). The 
Appellant showed a very intimate knowledge of all of 
the parties' property interests (R-143-145, 152, 159-
161). The evaluation placed on the properties by Re-
spondent were not at any time during the trial chal-
lenged by the Appellant. The Court divided the rea] 
property giving each party approximately one-half 
of the equity interests of the properties (R-39). Ap· 
pellant was further awarded $6,600.00 per year ali· 
mony, a Cadillac, furniture and furnishings, benefits 
of $150,000.00 insurance and $2,500.00 attorney fees. 
Defendant was awarded personal belongings, his busi-
ness, a car and truck, stock in a boat camp and a boat. 
Defendant was ordered to assume the debts and obli-
gations. ( R-38-40). 
Appellant filed a l\1otion for New Trial, which 
was denied, from which this appeal was taken. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS OF APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING DE-
3 
• 
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NE'V T 
PURSUANT TO RULE 59(4) U.R.C.P. RIAL 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DI~. 
CRETION IN THE DIVISION OF MARITAL 
PROPERTY AND FIXING ALIMONY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTINGDE· 
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
PURSUANT TO RULE 59(4) U.R.C.P. 
Rule 59 (a) U.R.C.P. lists the grounds for a ne~ 
trial as follows: Sub-Section ( 4). "Newly discovered 
evidence, material for the party making the applica· 
tion, which he could not, with reasonable diligence,lum 
discovered and produced at the time of the trial." (Em· 
phasis added) . 
The Appellant argues that the Trial Court abusd 
its discretion in not granting the Amended Motion!~ 
a New Trial for the purpose of presenting newly ifu· 
4 
C(ffered evidence. The so-called new evidence presented 
a: the time of hearing the .Motion was neither new evi ... 
deuce nor was it evidence that could not with reasonable 
diligence have been discovered and produced at the 
time of the trial. The evidence offered in support of 
the Motion was Defendant's Exhibit 8, a list and de-
,;cnptiou of each of the properties owned by the parties 
and au appraisal covering same. The same evidence 
,, a.•; presented to the Court as plaintiff's (Respondent's) 
Exhibit I, accompanied by detailed evidence about 
each property (R-64-69, 77, 78, 86-88 and 110-112). 
,"lt the hearing of the Motion, Appellant applied a dif-
fereni formula for computing the value of the individual 
properties, which was the only deviation from Re-
spondent's evidence at the trial. 
Each of the properties which were the subject to 
distribution of the parties by the Court are properties 
which were owned by the parties for a long period of 
time. ( R 119-120). 
The testimony of counsel for Appellant shows 
consultations prior to the time the action was filed by 
Respondent, ( R-104), at which time property settle-
ments were discussed. Appellant's attorney testified 
that he obtained a Restraining Order to prevent sale 
of properties by the Respondent (R-105) and obtained 
Respondent's tax returns and financial statements 
(R-106) both of which show the property interests, 
rental schedules, depreciation schedules, profit and loss 
statement of rental properties of the parties set out 
5 
therein (Exhibits P-2 and P-3) and (R-73-74) C 
f A · ounse] or ppellant also testified that "My best t' . 
es unaie 
that I have had telephone conversations with M L ' 
• .r r. und 
and various other attorneys dealing with property whicn 
l\ilr. Habbeshaw wanted to sell I would sav ha 
' .perp~ 
50 or 60 telephone calls. My estimate as far as hours 
I have spent on this would be somewhere between ij 
75 and 100 hours of consultation and research***· 
(R-167). On cross-examination of Respondent i:R· 
86-87, 110-112) each of the properties were identified 
and a reasonable rental for each unit was established. 
The rentals testified to by Respondent were not cha]. 
lenged by Appellant at the time of trial. 
By stipulation of counsel, after conference ~it~ 
the Court, it was agreed that Respondent's counsel 
would submit a Brief setting out all of the facts and 
figures concerning the real property acquired by thf 
parties during their marriage. ( R. 168) . Respondent 
had ten days to file the Brief, and the Appellant had 
ten days to answer the Brief. (R-169). Pursuant there· 
to, Respondent filed a Brief with the Court, with a 
copy to Appellant, setting out the value of each prop· 
erty, the purchase price, the equity, the amount of tbe 
mortgage, the holder of the mortgage, the monthly 
payment, income of property and delinquencies, if any. 
The information was available to Appellant and the 
answering Brief of the Appellant did not challenge 
t . the era!· any evaluations of properties. The proper ies, . 
uations as set out in Respondent's Exhibit lat the tune 
. f . t t in Respond· of trial was the same m orma ti on se ou 
6 
ent's Brief, the Appellant's Answering Brief and testi-
fied to by the Respondent on direct examination. (R-
64-69). 
The Appellant's intimate knowledge of each of 
the properties of the parties, as shown by her evidence, 
belies statements of Appellant that her present knowl-
edge of the property constitutes newly discovered evi-
dence. During the testimony of the Appellant she dis-
cussed each piece of property, which showed a full aware-
ness and knowledge of these holdings. (R-143-145, 
152, 159, 160, 161). 
The Appellant testified that "there are certain 
pieces of property I prefer over others, that is for sure." 
(R-143), and referring to a particular property at 
416-422 East 5th South, Appellant stated, " * * * has 
in my estimation great potential * * * " (R-143) and 
about 509 East 8th South, the Appellant testified, "It 
is an old house made into three units, it has a building 
lot there too, * * * ." (R-144). Again, referring to 
567 East 9th South and 866 South 6th East, the Ap-
pellant testified, "Yes, these should join into one piece 
of property. " (R-144 and 145). It is submitted that 
such knowedge of the properties by the Appellant 
and her counsel, at the time of trial, precludes the Ap-
pellant from raising the issue for a new trial using the 
theory of newly discovered evidence. 
On January 14, 1964, the Appellant filed a Motion 
to Vacate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Decree. (R-15-20). On page 3 of said Motion, 
7 
( R-17) Appellant lists all of the properties 1'd t'f . • en I YI"e 
each by address. The properties listed in the A 11· '.
1
e . ppe an,, 
Motion ~ R-17) .a~d those listed in Plaintiff's (Re: 
spondent s) Exl11b1t 1, are the same properties whi· 
were distributed to the parties in the Decree of n· . .i. norct 
after hearing by the District Court. 
The lVIotion to Yacate by Appellant was daterl 
January 14, 1964, and the trial was heard by the Cour. 
on the 14th day of May, 1964, four months later. !t 
is submitted that the detailed information co11cernuig 
the properties as set forth in the Motion to Yacatn 
the same information proposed January 26, 1965, mort 
than one year later, as an Amended Motion for a ~ew 
Trial, and as such does not meet with the requiremenb 
as a basis for a new trial as set forth in Rule 59 (a) Ui· 
U.R.C.P. 
This Court has been uniform in its holdings that 
the granting of a Motion for a New Trial is within t~ 
wide discretionary powers of the Trial Court. Set 
Glazier vs. Cram, 71 Utah 465, 267 Pac. 188; Uptow1 
Appliance & Radio Company, Inc., vs. Flint, 122 llfal 
298, 249 Pac. 2nd 826; Crellin vs. Thomas, 122 Ctal 
122, 246 Pac. 2nd 264; Greco vs. Gentile, 88 Utah 2jj 
53 P .2nd 1155; and Moulton vs. Staats, et al, 83 lTtali 
197 27 Pac. 2nd. 455. It is submitted that there wasm 
abuse of discretion by the Trial Court, the ruling ha1'lni 
. 1 . h 'd d" t' arv powers of th been clearly wit un t e w1 e iscre ion J 
Court. 
· · 't holdin~ 
The Court further has been umf orm m 1 s ' 
8 
that to entitle a party to a new trial on ground of newly 
discovered evidence it is necessary to show that the peti-
tioning party used due diligence to produce the evidence 
when the ease came up for trial. See Hydraulic Cement 
Block Company vs. Christensen, 38 Utah 525, 114 Pac . 
.524; Yan Dyke vs. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 
161 Pac. 50; Shields vs. Eckman, 67 Utah 474, 248 
Pac. 122; and State vs. Moore, 41 Utah 247, 126 Pac. 
:3:22. The evidence presented by Appellant at the hear-
ing of the Motion for a New Trial failed to show that 
it was newly discovered or that Appellant had used 
due diligence to produce the evidence at the time of 
trial. 
Finally, the evidence concerning the properties and 
full disclosure by the Respondent and Appellant of 
their values was summed up by the Appellant in her 
admission of knowledge of the properties on direct ex-
amination as follows: 
"Q. (.McCullough) : Now Mrs. Habbeshaw, 
you have heard your husband's testimony with 
respect to the property which has been accumu-
lated during your married life, have you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is there anything that has been omitted 
or failed to be mentioned with respect to your 
property? 
A. I think it has been pretty well covered." 
(R-116-117). 
9 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DI~. 
CRETION IN THE DIVISION OF MARITAL 
PROPERTY AND FIXING ALIMONY. 
The appellant argues that the Trial Court erredni 
awarding properties to Respondent that far exceed~ 
that awarded to Appellant and that such an award wa, 
an abuse of discretion. To determine whether the Cour: 
abused its discretion, the evidence upon which the awm 
was based should be examined. The evidence of \ht 
value of the properties (R-64-69, 77, 78, 86-88 an~ 
110-112) was as follows: 
PROPERTY A\VARD 
Appellant 
Gross Value $121,000.00 
Mortgages 35,913.68 
Equity 85,096.32 
Monthly 
Payments 681.00 
Respcmdent 
Gross Value $187,50U 
Mortgages 99,492.~ 
Equity ss,oorn 
:Monthly 
Payments 2,595.00 
It should be noted that none of the value placed on 
. d t (R 64 69) were chal· the properties by Respon en - -
lenged at the time of the trial. The award of the Courl 
gave the parties almost equal equity values. The pro~ 'th a proxi· 
erties of Respondent were encumbered WI P be. 
. t f rtgages encUJJl r mately three times the amoun o mo . . tilt 
. f A 11 t In addition, ing the properties o ppe an · 
10 
monthly payments of Respondent were approximately 
four times those required of Appellant. 
In addition, Appellant was awarded a 1956 Cadil-
lac. household furniture, the benefit of $150,000.00 life 
msura11ee (R-39) and the sum of $6,600.00 per year 
alimony payable at $550.00 per month (R-38). Further, 
the Appellant was awarded $2,500.00 for attorney 
fees ( R-39), and Respondent to pay the family debts 
and obligations. 
The award of alimony, in addition to the property 
interests, was granted in the amount of $6,600.00 per 
year, although Appellant testified to her monthly ex-
penses of only $413.00 per month (R-129-131), but 
asked that she be awarded $7,500.00 per year. (R-147). 
The Court, in determining the amount of alimony, con-
sidered the evidence of Appellant's employment as a 
licensed real estate salesman (R-150), the Respond-
ent's liabilities of approximately $80,000.00 (R-108, 
136-139) and Respondent's ability to pay (R-101), 
plus Appellant's rental income of $430.00 per month. 
(R-110-112). 
In the cases of Woolley vs. Woolley, 113 Utah 
321, 195 P2d 7 43; Bullen vs. Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262 
P 292; and Allen vs. Allen, 109 Utah 99, 165 Pac. 2d 
872, this Court adopts the majority rule that an equit-
able formula for computing the wife's award would be 
on a basis of one-third of the husband's property or in-
come. In the case at hand, the award to the Appellant 
11 
~'as in excess of one-third of Respondent's property 
01 
: 
mcome. 
The Court in the cases of Pinion vs. Pinion, 92 
1 
Utah 255, 67 P2d 65, and :MacDonald vs. MacDonald, 
120 Utah 573, 236 P2d 1066, set forth factors to ht 
considered by a Trial Court in determining the award 
of properties. Application of the facts of the present 
case to the determining factors set forth by these cam 
demonstrate that the Court did not abuse its discretion 
but actually exceeded the awards usually granted in 
such cases. 
Appellant advances the theory that the properties 
had a greater value than presented at the trial and : 
proposes Exhibit Defendant 8, an appraisal of prop· 
erties, to advance the theory. The basis of the increase 
of values is that the properties are all prime apartme111 ' 
locations. Appellant argues that the evaluation of two 
1 
of the properties were understated by $80,000.00. 
The Conclusion is not warranted nor is the evalu· 
ation of proper statement. The Court could not specu· 
late on the future development of any of the propertie~. 
To adopt the argument of Appellant would require • 
speculation by the Court which would include demo· ' 
lition of the present structures, financing and construct· 
ing new apartments for profitable rentals. 
As set out in the case of Bullen vs. Bullen anrl 
Ut h Allen vs. Allen, supra, Sorensen vs. Sorenson, 14 a. 
2nd 24, 376 Pac. 2nd 547; Tsoufakis vs. Tsoufakis. 
14 Utah 2nd. 273, 382 Pac. 2nd 412, and Wilson 11· 
12 
Wilson, 5 Utah 2nd. 79, 296 Pac. 2nd 977, this Court 
has uniformly adopted the rule that unless there has 
been a clear abuse of discretion the reviewing Court 
will not change the decision of the trial court. (Empha-
sis added). 
The Appellant wholly failed to present any new 
eridence which could not have been discovered before 
the trial. Further, the Appellant wholly failed to show 
due diligence was used to discover the so-called new 
evidence. Failure of the Appellant to make the proper 
showing cannot now be claimed to be an abuse of dis-
cretion by the Trial Court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that under the evidence 
presented in this case, the Trial Court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying Appellant's Motion for a New 
Trial, nor did the Court err in distributing the property 
and fixing the amount of alimony for Appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANCIS C. LUND 
Attorney for Respondent 
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